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Abstract 
 
Social Perception of Children with 
 Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
Alyssa Simone Luckenbach, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisors:  Barbara Davis, Jessica Franco 
 
A broad review of assessment and intervention research relevant to Theory of 
Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1985) and Autism Spectrum Disorders from birth to age twelve was 
conducted.  Nine assessment articles were reviewed to examine the major differences 
between children with autism spectrum disorders and children who are typically 
developing, particularly in the area of social perception.  Assessment tasks aimed to 
discover a child’s thoughts relevant to another’s thoughts, beliefs, and emotions.  It was 
discovered that children with autism spectrum disorders performed less well on Theory of 
Mind tasks, and tended to provide responses that were more egocentric and idiosyncratic 
in nature.  A review of the intervention research revealed improvement in Theory of 
Mind domains is possible when teaching strategies explicitly target goals relevant to 
perspective taking.  Generalization of skills to natural environments was a lacking area 
across all twelve articles, indicating a need for more intensive practice in natural 
environments.  Interestingly, when social skills were taught in the absence of Theory of 
Mind training, no collateral effects were observed to Theory of Mind domain.    
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 1 
Introduction 
Social communication and interaction are fundamental aspects of everyday life. 
Skills required to be successful in these areas include social perception and 
understanding, which begins developing very early on in typically developing children.  
For the child with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), however, development of social 
skills does not come as naturally. Social impairment is considered a core feature of 
children with ASD (Carter, Davis, Klin, & Volkmar, 2005).  Research thus far has 
revealed this deficit to be caused by an inability to identify social cues and norms (Nah & 
Poon, 2010) and failure to take into account others’ mental states (Rajendran & Mitchell, 
2007).     
Inadequacy in these areas leads to an individual experiencing difficulty in all 
aspects of life (i.e. personal relationships, work, etc.).  One particular social skill is 
thought to be paramount to success in social interaction and has become a major area of 
focus in research over the last two decades.  Theory of Mind (TOM) is known as the 
ability to take on the thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of another person (Adolphs, Sears & 
Piven, 2001).  Essentially, it is the understanding that others’ thoughts are different from 
your own, which is a critical component to social interaction. Ultimately, our ability to 
understand others thoughts determine the actions and behaviors we display.   For children 
with ASD, TOM is often severely delayed or lacking entirely (Hutchins & Prelock, 2008; 
Miller, 2006).  Examining this area of deficit has potential to tap into the mind of the 
child with ASD, to understand what she thinks, feels, and believes about her peers, which 
can provide useful information at every stage of the assessment and intervention 
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process.  Furthermore, investigating children’s perception of others can provide parents 
and families’ valuable insight into the best possible school and educational settings for 
their child. 
 In order to better understand the development of social perception in children with 
autism, this paper will review the available literature pertaining to ASD and focus on 
elementary school age children.  Studies related to assessment and intervention of theory 
of mind capacities will be reviewed to evaluate the hypothesis that children with ASD 
unintentionally violate social norms and behavioral rules (Nah & Poon, 2011) due to 
deficits in theory of mind.  This deficit impacts their ability to make inferences, attend to, 
and engage in appropriate conversation with peers.   
Research data pertinent to two questions will be analyzed in this paper utilizing 
the information from the relevant assessment and intervention literature: 
1. Based on the available research examining theory of mind deficits, how do children 
with high functioning autism socially perceive their peers (Chapter 2)? 
2. Based on effective interventions, what can be concluded as appropriate educational 
placement for children with high functioning autism (Chapter 3)? 
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Chapter 1: Background on Theory of Mind 
In order to provide a basic understanding of its theoretical background, 
developmental trajectory, and deficits present in children with ASD, the following 
section will present a broad overview of Theory of Mind. 
A critical background for understanding social perceptions of the child with ASD 
is to understand their major impairments and/or deficits specific to social impairment.  A 
current review of the available literature describing assessment and intervention 
pertaining to Theory of Mind (TOM) abilities will provide an avenue into this area.  Prior 
to reviewing the relevant research, it is critical to provide an overview describing the 
major elements of TOM abilities.  The following section will 1) define theory of mind, 2) 
outline the expected TOM milestones reached by typically developing individuals from 
birth to early adolescence, and 3) explain the expected TOM deficits for children with 
ASD.  
 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (TOM) is a dynamic construct (Astington & Baird, 2005) that 
includes a repertoire of abilities related to social functioning, all of which are necessary 
for competent communication (Miller, 2006).  Most notable components involve the 
ability make inferences of others’ thoughts, feelings, and emotions (Peterson & 
Slaughter, 2009), which is central to social life (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004).  
TOM aids in the understanding that thoughts and beliefs guide behaviors of others 
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(Peterson & Slaughter, 2009), making it possible to predict actions, desires, and 
intentions (Hutchins, 2008).   
Researchers acknowledge distinct categories of TOM including cognitive, 
affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal (Westby, 2012). Westby and colleagues note 
that the first, cognitive TOM encompasses the ability to attribute mental states.  This area 
is considered to be an early developing, first-order false belief understanding, which can 
be defined as the ability to accurately infer another person’s beliefs pertaining to a 
tangible object or event.  Affective TOM includes the ability to both share emotions and 
understand emotions of others, which drives ones behavior.  Interpersonal TOM is the 
process of inferring thoughts and feelings of other.  Finally, intrapersonal TOM is the 
ability to reflect one’s own thoughts, knowledge, and emotions.  With this ability, an 
individual is able to monitor his/her own behavior (Westby, 2012).  Each category 
demonstrates increasing complexity, which reveals TOM to be dynamic and evolutionary 
in nature.  
For typically developing individuals, TOM reasoning is carried out with little 
conscious reflection and is so closely related to the maturation of language it is rarely 
recognized as a distinct part of development (Miller, 2006).  However, it is broadly 
believed that children with autism do not develop TOM ability along the same trajectory 
as their typically developing counterparts.  TOM is thought to be a major contributor to 
the core social, behavioral, and communicative deficits present in the child with ASD 
(Hutchins & Prelock, 2008).   
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Primary characteristics of ASD include marked deficits in communication, 
impaired ability to establish and maintain social relationships, and restrictive, repetitive, 
and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  Within this population are children who vary greatly in the type and 
severity of deficits they display, making the disorder complex in nature.  According to the 
recent DSM-5 diagnostic manual (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th ed., 2013), 
autism disorders no longer exists as individual subtypes (i.e. pervasive developmental 
disorder-not otherwise specified/PDD-NOS, Asperger syndrome, autistic disorder, 
childhood disintegrative disorder), rather, all children are diagnosed as having ASD.  
While this large umbrella term is used to describe all children with ASD, it is necessary 
to distinguish groups based on the uniqueness of their deficits to insure appropriate 
assessment and intervention is provided to each individual child.  Research reviewed here 
will pertain to children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) who have average or 
above average intelligence and are considered high functioning.  Generally, this group 
includes children with IQs above seventy.  Diagnoses may include high functioning 
autism spectrum disorder (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th ed., 1994;HFASD) 
Asperger syndrome (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th ed., 1994; AS), Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th 
ed., 1994; PDD-NOS), or autism diagnoses (AD). 
Within this subtype are individuals who have average or above average 
intellectual abilities, but display marked deficits in cognition most relevant to social 
functioning (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001).  Both verbal and nonverbal communication 
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are persistent areas of difficulty, making social interactions and verbal transactions a 
major challenge (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).   According to Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997), individuals with ASD have a particularly difficult time 
recognizing complex emotions from faces. They may show little awareness of others’ 
feelings and emotions (Kaland at al., 2008). 
 
Development of Theory of Mind 
Although a child is not born with TOM ability, it develops slowly over time.  In 
infancy, a child displays certain prerequisite behaviors prior to or during the development 
of TOM.  These include joint attention, use of gestures and mental state terms (i.e. think, 
know, want), pretend play, appreciation of intentionality, and recognition of differing 
perspectives (Miller, 2006).  For typically developing infants around six to ten months of 
age it is common for him/her to follow an adult’s head and demonstrate gaze shifts, 
otherwise known as joint attention (Miller, 2006; Westby, 2012).  It is believed that joint 
attention is deeply intertwined in the development of TOM due to the understanding that 
people are “intentional agents” who have independent motives that drive actions  
(Hutchins & Prelock, 2008).  As a result of this understanding children will engage with 
others via joint attention and develop a very basic understanding of intentionality 
(Tomasello, 1995).  While variability exists amongst individuals, it is believed the ability 
to infer mental states of another is said to develop by 36 months of age (Leslie et al., 
2004), but can be witnessed as early as 18 months (Repacholi	  &	  Gopnik,	  1997).  It is 
around this same time that children begin to talk about mental states such as “I think” or 
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“I know” (Miller, 2006) and engage in pretend play schemes (Westby, 2012).   By four 
years of age a typically developing child can correctly categorize mental state terms from 
action words.     
What is commonly referred to as first-order false belief understanding is usually 
achieved between three and four years of age (Hutchins & Prelock, 2008; Leslie et al., 
2004; Wellman et al., 2001).  This understanding is an early form of TOM and involves 
the “attribution about other’s false belief with regard to real events” (Bauminger & 
Kasari, 1999).  It is considered the precursor to the more sophisticated second-order false 
belief understanding.  As one might suspect, TOM is fluid in nature; much like other 
aspects of development it continues to evolve (Wellman et al., 2001) in a stage-like 
manner as children gain a more mature understanding of others thoughts and motives 
(Beeger et al., 2012).   
Second-order false-belief understanding, said to emerge between 5 and 6 years of 
age (Sullivan	   &	   Tager-­‐Flusberg,	   1994), is the ability to think about other people’s 
thoughts.  This social understanding is undoubtedly more advanced and refined than first-
order false belief, as children are able to decipher that different interpretations may be 
made by two different individuals (Hutchins & Prelock, 2008).  For example, a child who 
demonstrates adequate second-order understanding is able to predict an individual’s 
belief about an emotion.  Further, children gain the ability to “make appropriate 
judgments of situations in which one knows, remembers, forgets, or guesses” (Westby, 
2012).  A broader understanding of emotions are also developed around 6-8 years of age, 
as children are able to understand emotions are a result of what an individual thinks even 
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when those thoughts don’t match reality (Westby, 2012).  By ten years of age a typically 
developing child should understand the concept of deceit, figurative language, sarcasm, 
and social faux pas (Westby, 2012).  While variability exists, these are the expected 
milestones in the area of TOM development for typically developing individuals.     
 
Deficits in Theory of Mind 
 The available research clearly demonstrates that theory of mind follows a 
developmental pattern for children who are typically developing.  As children grow, so 
does their cognitive capacity and social understanding.  Recently, there has been a 
considerable increase in the attention to either delayed or lacking capacities specific to 
TOM. Particular interest has been directed towards deficits in TOM over the past two 
decades in the areas of research specific to ASD (Hutchins & Prelock, 2008).    While 
variable, the majority of research suggests deficits are unique to children with autism 
(Hutchins, 2008).  For example, individuals with Down syndrome (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1985) matched on equivalent mental age have been shown to demonstrate TOM 
ability by passing of false belief assessment tasks.   
Deficits in TOM manifest in a multitude of ways, impacting the “acquisition and 
processing of information relevant to social competency across contexts (Stitcher, 
O’Conner, Herzog, Lierheimer, & McGhee, 2012).   Because TOM deficits cause an 
individual to have difficulty inputting mental states to themselves and others, children 
may lack the necessary awareness to build meaningful peer relationships. At early 
educational stages, this deficit can have grave impact as learning and social interactions 
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are closely intertwined.  Based on the research conducted over the last two decades, 
researchers established that children with ASD experience challenges recognizing and 
matching emotions, understanding non-literal language, intentions, and theory of mind 
tasks (Steele, Joseph, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003).  Further, children with ASD utilize fewer 
affective expressions (Bauminger, 2002), have difficulties recognizing faux pas (Baron-
Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), and often have trouble with adjusting 
behavior to accommodate to a situation.  As one might imagine, these delayed or lacking 
cognitive capacities contribute to the core social, communicative, and behavioral deficits 
that characterize ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1995).   
While these are the core deficits expected to be present, it is important to 
acknowledge the variability that exists amongst children diagnosed with autism. Wellman 
& Liu (2004) state “TOM understanding evidences a progression of insights that unfold 
over development”.  Thus, it would be incorrect to suggest that TOM skills are either 
present or absent; TOM should not be characterized in such a black and white manner.  
Rather, there appears to be a broad spectrum of abilities from one individual to the next.  
To say that children with ASD experience delayed or inconsistent acquisition of TOM 
would be a more accurate assumption.  It seems that the progression of development may 
take place differently or in a delayed manner from their typically developing 
counterparts.   
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Review of Theory of Mind 
Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) experience a broad array of 
deficits in the areas of communication, emotion regulation, and social interaction.  As one 
might suspect these deficits manifest in various ways, impacting the child’s educational 
and social environments. 
This paper will examine a critical area related to social functioning, Theory of 
Mind (TOM), and draw from it information relevant to social perception of the child with 
ASD.  Because research suggests that marked deficits in this particular area are unique to 
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders, an in depth examination of this area in 
isolation is needed.  In order to do so, this paper will review the relevant available 
research specific to assessment of TOM ability and interventions aimed at improving this 
area of deficit.  From this information assessments will be categorized based on the type 
and degree of complexity (i.e. basic first-order false belief tasks, advanced second-order 
false belief tasks). Key elements of available intervention approaches aimed at improving 
TOM deficits will be described.  This review involves a systematic analysis of 
assessment and intervention studies that examine theory of mind (TOM) as an outcome 
variable for children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). 
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CHAPTER 2: Assessment of Theory of Mind 
 A first major question posed in this review is to analyze research to consider the 
following: Based on the available assessment research examining theory of mind deficits, 
how do children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) socially perceive their peers?  
The following section is a review of the available measures to assess TOM relevant to 
that question.  This analysis will provide an avenue to draw conclusions regarding social 
perceptions of children with ASD from available research.  For example, when a child 
with ASD is in conversation with a peer in a social setting, how does he/she perceive the 
situation and what inferences can he/she make about the other person?  Furthermore, how 
do those perceptions impact the conversation?      
Methods 
In order to answer the preceding question, the following search procedures and 
inclusion criteria were set to ascertain studies of particular relevance to TOM assessment 
measures for children with ASD. 
Search Procedures.  
Systematic searches were conducted in five electronic databases: Communication 
& Mass Media Complete (CMMC), MEDLINE, Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied 
Health (CINAHL), and PsycINFO, and ERIC.  In all databases, the following terms were 
inserted into the keyword field: a) theory of mind assessment and children with autism. 
Inclusion Criteria 
To be included in this review, the article had to meet the following criteria:  
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(a) The studies included at least one participant with a formal diagnosis of autism, ASD, 
AS, HFASD, or PDD-NOS. 
(b) The majority of participants in each assessment article had to be under the age of 
twelve.  Of the nine assessment articles reviewed, three contained participants out of the 
specific age range.  For the purposes of this report, these results were interpreted with 
caution.  
(c) The studies contained clinical assessments that directly measured TOM 
performance/ability of children with autism, ASD, AS, PDD-NOS, or HFASD.   
(d) Assessment articles were published in peer-reviewed journals after the year 1999 (i.e. 
2000-present).    
The most common reasons for exclusion were as follows: 1) The methods of 
assessment was based on interviewing parents or using checklists (2 of these), 3) The 
methods of assessment was solely qualitative in nature (1 of these), or 4) The studies 
focused on a comparison between two assessment measures rather than the differences in 
abilities between typically developing and children with ASD (2 of these).  
Results 
Table 3.1 provides the following information: 1) the current researchers utilizing the 
assessment measure, 2) description of participants including age, diagnosis, and IQ range 
(if available), 3) the name of the assessment employed, classified by two broad categories 
(i.e. basic first-order false belief tasks, second-order advanced TOM tasks), 4) a brief 
description of the key components, and 5) subsequent results.  The two broad categories 
of assessments are based on the complexity of the tasks.  First-order false belief tasks are 
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believed to tap into basic, early developing TOM abilities.  This involves the attribution 
of other’s false beliefs based on a tangible object or real event.  Advanced TOM tasks, 
otherwise known as second-order false belief tasks, are intended to measure an 
individual’s ability to think about another person’s thoughts.  While there are variations 
in what assessments precisely measure, these basic definitions can provide a broader 
understanding of each major category.  Key elements and major components of 
assessment measures are further discussed below.   
 
Table 2.1 Summary of Theory of Mind Assessments 
Study	   Child	   Assessme
nt	  
Key Components	   Results	  
  First 
Order  
  
Van 
Buijsen 
et al. 
(2011)	  
N=27	  
Age=4-
7	  
ASD	  
Sally 
Anne 
False 
Belief 
Task 	  
1) Objects are placed in a 
container by person A (ex. 
marble in a basket) and then 
leaves the room, 2) Objects 
transferred to another 
container by person B, 3) 
Person A returns to room; 
Child is asked “Where will 
person A look for the object?”; 
task presented via different 
modes: spoken, video, and line 
drawing 	  
ASD performed ASD group were 
impacted by the mode of presentation 
while TD children were not; Children 
with ASD were not able to pass 
spoken presentation, which indicates 
they have trouble picking out 
essential information on an already 
complex task as compared to TD 
peers 	  
Van 
Buijsen 
et al. 
(2011)	  
N=27	  
Age=4-
7	  
ASD	  
Smarties 
Task 
(Appearan
ce–Reality 
Task)	  
Task draws upon child’s own 
experience by using different 
characters and objects 
containing unexpected objects 
(ex. showing a smarties 
package that contains a pencil) 
and then asking the child what 
others think will be in the 
package; task presented via 
different modes: spoken, 
video, and line drawing	  
ASD group were impacted by the 
mode of presentation while TD 
children were not; Although ceiling 
were nearly reached for all 3 
presentations, lowest scores resulted 
on line drawing presentation	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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Van 
Buijsen 
et al. 
(2011)	  
N=27	  
Age=4-
7	  
ASD	  
The 
Charlie 
Task	  
Task assesses the ability of the 
child to read the mentalistic 
significance of the eyes; 3 
characters with different 
objects (i.e. fruits, toys, and 
sweets) were presented; Ex. 
After a character looks to the 
object he desires, the child was 
asked to name the items the 
character most desires; task 
presented via different modes: 
spoken, video, and line 
drawing 	  
ASD group were impacted by the 
mode of presentation while TD 
children were not; Children with ASD 
had lowest scores with spoken and 
video versions indicating 
interpretation of real-life gaze 
information is a challenge for 
children with ASD 	  
Beeger 
et al. 
(2013)	  
N=40	  
Age=8-
13	  
HFASD
, AD, 
AS, 
PDD-
NOS	  
IQ>70	  
The 
Sandbox 
Task 
(Continuo
us false 
belief)	  
Pictures of an object being 
buried and reburied in sandbox 
were shown to children, then a 
false belief story was read 
aloud; children were asked to 
indicate object location based 
on the stories provided	  
When compared to TD peers, children 
with ASD gave egocentric responses 
more often (i.e. indicated location 
based on their own privileged 
knowledge); Performance increased 
as age increased	  
Lind & 
Bowler 
(2010)	  
N=40	  
Age=5-
17	  
AS, 
AD, 
PDD-
NOS	  
VIQ=3
9-102	  
Seeing is 
Knowing 
Task	  
Children were shown 5 boxes, 
each with distinct appearance 
and each containing a different 
toy object; 2 dolls (i.e. John & 
Fiona) were introduced and 
were either shown the box or 
what was inside the box; 
Children were asked “Who 
knows what’s in the box?”; 
task repeated with different 
objects and characters 5 times 
for each participant; Task 
designed to assess explicit 
understanding of the 
relationship between 
informational access and 
knowledge  	  
When compared to TD peers matched 
on age and verbal ability, ASD group 
were found to perform significantly 
less well on tasks 	  
Sivarat
nam et 
al. 
(2012)	  
N=12 
Age=6-
8 
IQ>70 
HFASD
, AD	  
Comic 
Strip Task 
(CST)	  
Intentions and Emotions 
subscales (belief subscale was 
removed due to low internal 
consistency); 21 total items; 5-
picture comic strips illustrating 
everyday social scenarios; 
children presented with stories 
and alternate endings were 
asked which one best 
completes story and why 
	  
HFASD group performed 
significantly lower than TD group on 
the Intentions subscale; HFASD 
group performed equally well on the 
Emotions subscales; Results suggest 
that basic emotion-understanding in 
HFASD is comparable to TD children 	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Table 2.1 (continued) 
  Second-
Order 
  
Peterso
n & 
Slaught
er 
(2009) 
N=22 
Age=6-
13 
AD 
 
Simplified 
Eye-
Reading 
Test 
(SERT) 
Eye photos depicted emotions 
(i.e. upset, scared, sad, kind, 
friendly, thinking, not 
believing, worried, 
remembering) and were 
presented to participants; 
results were compared to 
traditional first-order false 
belief task to determine 
correlation 	  
Children with autism discerned 
meaning of the eye expressions as 
accurately as TD children of the same 
age; Results revealed significant 
correlations between SERT and false 
belief scores for children as a whole 	  
Kaland 
et al 
(2008) 
N=21	  
Age=10
-20	  
IQ>80	  
AS, 
PDD-
NOS	  
 
The Eyes 
Task	  
28 black/white photographs of 
the eye region; participants 
had to distinguish the correct 
simple mental state (ex. 
serious, bored) and describe 
what the person in the photo 
might be thinking  	  
When compared to the TD control 
group, AS group: 	  
-performed less well with regard to 
number of correct mental state target 
words	  
Kaland 
et al 
(2008) 
N=21	  
Age=10
-20	  
IQ>80	  
AS, 
PDD-
NOS	  
 
The 
Strange 
Stories 
Task	  
24 mentalistic vignettes 
comprised of pretense, joke, 
lie, white lie, 
misunderstanding, persuasion, 
appearance/reality, figure of 
speech, irony, double bluff, 
contrary emotions, and 
forgetting; Vignettes read 
aloud to children and were 
asked test questions specific to 
the underlying intention of 
character in the story	  
When compared to TD control group, 
AS group:	  
-obtained a lower total score than TD 
controls on task	  
-needed significantly more prompt 
questions than controls to answer the 
questions	  
-gave more context-inappropriate 
mental state inferences	  
Kaland 
et al 
(2008) 
N=21	  
Age=10
-20	  
IQ>80	  
AS, 
PDD-
NOS	  
 
The 
Stories 
from 
Everyday 
Life 	  
26 contextually demanding 
short stories comprised of lie, 
white lie, figure of speech, 
misunderstanding, double 
bluff, irony, persuasion, 
contrary emotions, forgetting, 
jealousy, intentions, empathy, 
and social blunders; 
Participants were required to 
infer mental states	  
When compared to TD control group, 
AS group:	  
-performed significantly less well 	  
-had a significantly longer response 
time on mental state inference task	  
-Needed significantly more prompt 
questions when answering test 
questions 	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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Beaum
ont & 
Sotrono
ff 
(2008) 
N=26	  
Age=7-
11	  
IQ>85	  
AS	  
Animated 
Theory of 
Mind 
Inventory 
for 
Children 
(ATOMIC
)	  
12 computerized cartoons 
presented to children; 7 TOM 
questions following 
presentation examined the 
ability to infer complex mental 
states (ex. guilt, 
embarrassment); 5 TOM 
questions examined characters 
cognition; 	  
Participants with AS performed more 
poorly than TD children on the TOM 
Questions and memory questions 
(possible attention and/or memory 
deficits may have contributed to poor 
TOM task performance	  
Scheere
n et al. 
(2013)	  
N=194	  
Age=10
-16	  
IQ>70	  
AS, 
PDD-
NOS, 
HFASD	  
Social 
Stories	  
Story narrative were read 
aloud to child and examined 
second-order false beliefs, 
display rules, double bluff, 
faux pas, and sarcasm; 
Physical and mental state 
questions followed	  
HFASD & TD children performed 
equally well on TOM stories; task 
performance positively associated 
with chronological age and verbal 
ability; Researcher suggest challenges 
with advanced mental state reasoning 
may only be present in everyday 
social interactions	  
Peterso
n et al. 
(2012); 
adapted 
from 
Wellma
n & Liu 
(2004)	  
N=85	  
Age=5-
12	  
AS, AD	  
6 Step 
TOM 
Scale	  
Tasks: 1) diverse desires, 2) 
diverse beliefs, 3) knowledge 
and access, 4) false belief, 5) 
hidden emotion, 6) sarcastic 
irony (SARC)	  
Tasks revealed children with Autism 
were delayed relative to TD peers on 
all 6 tasks	  
Number of participants (N); Age (A); Intelligence quotient (IO); Verbal Intelligence quotient (VIO); 
Autism disorder (AD); Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD); High functioning autism disorder (HFASD); 
Pervasive developmental disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD); Asperger syndrome (AS)  
 
Review of Theory of Mind Assessments 
 Based on the studies reviewed, it is obvious TOM tasks are diverse in nature.  As 
such, it is imperative to review the major elements and key components of each 
assessment measure.  Major areas of interest relative to this review involve what 
researchers aimed to measure, and how this relates to a child’s social perception of their 
peers.   
A review of the studies revealed two broad categories of TOM assessments, first-
order false belief and second-order advanced TOM tasks.  These two categories can be 
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distinguished by the degree of complexity that is required to correctly respond to the task 
items.  Below will be an examination of critical elements of each assessment belonging to 
the two broad categories.  Based on the information from the assessment research I will 
discuss the skills required to correctly attribute the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of 
others based on complexity of the tasks.  This will allow some conclusions to be drawn 
pertaining to how children with ASD perceive peer interactions.  
 
First Order False Belief Tasks 
Of the thirteen studies reviewed, four consisted of first-order false belief tasks 
(Beeger, Bernstein, Van Wijhe, Scheeren, & Koot, 2013; Van Buijsen, Hendricks, 
Ketelaars, & Verhoeven 2011; Lind & Bowler, 2010).  Assessment measures were 
characterized by an individual’s belief about tangible objects or actions.  While many 
variations of first-order false belief tasks exist, the ultimate goal of tasks remained 
constant: to accurately measure a child’s social cognitive ability.   
The classic Sally Anne Task was utilized by Van Buijsen et al. (2011) to compare 
performance of children with ASD to their typically developing peers.  Twenty-seven 
participants were included in the study between the ages of 4 and 7.  This task involved 
showing the participant two characters, Sally and Anne.  Both characters saw an objects 
initial location (ex. a book on a table).  When Sally left the room, Anne moved the book 
to a new location (ex. into a cabinet).  Once Sally returned, the child was asked, “Where 
will Sally look for the book?”  If the child said the original location (i.e. the table) this 
indicated he/she understood Anne held privileged knowledge.   
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Correctly answering the belief question indicated the participant had the most 
basic, early developing TOM ability.  On the contrary, when a child responded by saying 
the new location (i.e. the cabinet), this response indicated the child did not understand 
Sally was missing information.  This task attempted to measure the participant’s 
understanding that different people hold different knowledge based on what they see.  In 
other words, it is awareness that individuals have their own distinct beliefs that may not 
match reality (i.e. Sally believes the book is on the table even though it is really not).   
A similar assessment measure called the Appearance-Reality Task draws upon the 
child’s previous experiences and/or knowledge about an object.  Van Buijsen et al. 
(2001) administered this assessment to the same group of participants for comparison 
purposes.  During this task a container (ex. A Smarties candy bag) held an unexpected 
object (ex. pencil).  The examiner then asked the child what he/she thought another 
person would believe was inside the Smarties bag.  In this particular task, the main area 
of interest was the distinction between an objects appearance versus reality.   
The Charlie Task was the third task Van Buijsen and colleagues utilized for 
comparison purposes (2011).  The goal of this task was slightly different in that it 
measured the child’s ability to read the mentalistic significance of the eyes.  Tangible 
objects (e. g. toys, fruits) were placed on a table in front of an individual, and the 
examiner asked that individual which one he/she most desired.  The individual then 
looked to that object in order to indicate the desired object.  The child, who witnessed this 
presentation, was asked to name the object the individual most desired.  While this task 
 19 
was slightly more complex than the Sally-Anne or Charlie tasks, the goal was similar: to 
assess the child’s understanding of another person’s thoughts. 
Van Buijsen et al. (2011) went a step further and compared participants 
performance when the three assessment measures were presented via different modes (i.e. 
video, line drawings, and spoken).  Researchers administered all three tasks to children 
with ASD, children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI), and TD children aged 
between 4-6 years of age.  Performance was compared once participants were matched on 
age, sex, and non-verbal age.  Researchers wanted to know: 1) Did the mode of 
presentation across the three tasks impact performance differently across groups of 
children and 2) did TOM in the various presentation modes relate to the participant’s 
verbal age, non-verbal age, and short-term memory capacity?  In total, nine presentations 
were administered to participants (i.e. Sally-Anne, Charlie, and Smartie task presented 
via video, line drawing, and spoken).  Results revealed both ASD and SLI groups 
performed significantly less well on TOM tasks as compared to their TD peers. In 
addition, children with ASD demonstrated significantly different performance on TOM 
tasks based on presentation mode across all three tasks.  For the Sally-Anne and Charlie 
tasks children with ASD were not able to pass the spoken presentation.  The line drawing 
presentation was most challenging for the ASD group during the Smarties task.  Because 
results were similar for the SLI participants, it was concluded that mode of presentation 
had an impact on performance only for children with communication disorders (i.e., 
ASD, SLI). 
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The Sandbox task (Beeger et al., 2012) aimed at measuring more subtle egocentric 
biases as compared to other first-order false-belief tasks.  Researchers compared 
participants with HFASD, AD, AS, and PDD-NOS to typically developing peers between 
8-13 years of age with IQ scores of seventy and above.  This continuous task measured 
the “extent to which participants could ignore or disregard their own beliefs in order to 
reason from an ignorant perspective on a continuous scale” (Beeger et al., 2012, p. 358).  
Interestingly, this task was presented on two-dimensional stimulus (i.e. paper).  Children 
looked at pictures of a sandbox while listening to a relevant story, and were then asked to 
indicate the perceived location of the object by pointing.  Similar to previously discussed 
tasks, the goal was to examine the child’s ability to infer mental states/thoughts of the 
characters in the stories.  Results revealed children with HFASD to be more egocentric in 
their responses, even when controlling for age and verbal ability.   
The Seeing is Knowing Task was utilized by Lind & Bowler (2010) for purposes 
of comparing TD children to those with ASD matched on age and verbal mental age.  
Participants were between 5-17 years of age and had a verbal IQ between 39 and 107.  
During this task children were shown five unique looking boxes, each of which held a 
distinct object or toy inside.  Two characters, John and Fiona, were introduced to the 
participants.  John and Fiona were then shown either the outside of the box or the inside 
of the box.  Participants watched the scenario take place, and are then asked, “Who 
knows what is in the box?”  Similar to the Charlie task, this task requires an 
understanding mental significance of a character’s eye gaze.  When one of the characters 
looks into the box and sees the object, does the participant understand that is privileged 
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knowledge? Results revealed children with ASD performed significantly less well than 
the comparison group.  In addition to the initial comparison between groups, researchers 
went a step further and excluded those who failed the control task.  After re-analyzing the 
data with only the participants who passed the see-know test in both comparison groups, 
results remained consistent and differences were still found to be significant.  Because 
this task had no ceiling effects, results were considered to be more reliable. 
A final assessment measure within this category was unique to in that it did not 
measure tangible objects, rather, it measured basic TOM understanding relative to 
intention and emotion.  For this reason, it was not considered a complex, advanced 
second-order false belief task.  Sivaratnam and colleagues (2012) gathered 12 participants 
with either HFASD or AD between the 6 and 8 years old.  They were interested in 
children’s performance on the Comic Strip Task (CST), which contained a belief, 
intention, and emotion subscale.  The comic strips illustrated everyday social scenarios 
with alternate endings.  Children were asked to choose the ending that best completed the 
story and then they had to explain why.  Results revealed that the children with ASD 
performed significantly lower that the TD group on the Intentions subscale across all five 
items.  Interestingly, the Emotion subscale revealed that the ASD group performed 
equally as well as the TD group.  The final subscale, Beliefs, was removed from the 
assessment measure due to low internal consistency.  Researchers suggest that results 
show the most basic-emotion understanding is comparable across ASD and TD 
populations.      
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Advanced Theory Of Mind Tasks 
 Seven of the thirteen assessment tasks aimed at tapping into higher order mental 
state thinking (Sivaratnam et al., 2012; Peterson & Slaughter, 2009; Kaland et al., 2008; 
Beaumont & Sotronoff, 2008; Scheeren et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2012).  These can be 
classified as second-order false belief tasks, as participants were asked to attribute 
embedded mental states of another.   
 Two assessment measures focused on reading emotions in the eyes (Peterson & 
Slaughter, 2009, SERT; Kaland et al., 2008, The Eyes Task).  Both studies presented 
black and white photographs to two groups (i.e. TD group vs ASD group).  Photographs 
showed just the eye region presenting a mental state (ex. serious, bored, sad, friendly, 
thinking).  Because tasks of this nature are more complex and are testing higher-order 
mental state reasoning, participants ranged from 6-20 years of age.   
The easier of the two tasks, SERT, was presented to children between the ages of 
6-13 years of age (Peterson & Slaughter, 2009).  Results from the study revealed that 
children with ASD discerned meaning of eye expressions equally as well as typically 
developing peers. Scores were then compared to first-order false belief task scores, which 
revealed significant correlations to the group as a whole.  Results indicate the SERT task 
may have been to simple and ceilings were too low to discriminate between the two 
groups.  For The Eyes Task (Kaland et al., 2008), results discriminated between groups to 
a larger degree.  Children in this group were between 10-20 years of age, and the study 
group was formally diagnosed with either AS or PDD-NOS.  When compared to their TD 
 23 
peers, children with ASD performed less well with regard to the number of correct 
mental state target words. 
 Five assessment measures focused on short story narratives or computerized 
cartoons that examined a child’s ability to interpret TOM components such as faux pas, 
sarcasm, hidden emotion, diverse desires, intentions, and social blunders (Kaland et al., 
2008; Beaumont & Sotronoff, 2008; Scheeren et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2012).  
Researchers were interested in participants’ ability to perceive underlying intentions of 
characters from the stories and cartoons.  The Stories From Everyday Life (Kaland et al., 
2008) consisted of 26 contextually demanding stories that described actions and 
proceeding climax.  Mental state and control questions were asked to participants 
between 10-20 years of age and a formal diagnosis of AS or PDD-NOS.  This required 
them to infer mental states of the characters from the stories.  Similarly, the Strange 
Stories Task was comprised of 24 stories read aloud to the participants between 10-20 
years of age (Kaland et al., 2008).  Results from the two assessment measures revealed 
similar results.  The study group obtained lower overall scores on assessment tasks and 
required significantly more prompt questions to respond.  Results from The Strange 
Stories Task revealed the children with AS or PDD-NOS gave more context-
inappropriate mental state inferences than the TD group.  As for the Stories From 
Everyday Life, children with AS and PDD-NOS had a significantly longer response time 
as compared to their TD peers.   
 The Animated Theory of Mind Inventory for Children (ATOMIC) consisted of 12 
computerized cartoons, which were presented to children between the ages of 7-11.   
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Each cartoon was presented and followed by two multiple-choice questions. These 
questions aimed at examining the child’s ability to infer complex emotions or were 
related to the characters’ cognitions.  Memory and central coherence questions were also 
included in the assessment to examine the child’s ability to attend to tasks and to 
integrate information unrelated to TOM capacity.  Results revealed children with AS 
performed significantly more poorly than their TD peers on TOM and memory questions.  
Because there was a correlation seen in performance on TOM and memory questions, 
researchers indicated poor attention skills may contribute to poor TOM task performance.   
  Scheeren et al. (2013) conducted a study using social stories to examine second-
order false beliefs, display rules, double bluffs, faux pas, and sarcasm.  Each advanced 
domain was examined through five different story narratives, which were read aloud to 
participants between ten and sixteen years of age.  Stories were presented typed on paper, 
and the children were given the option to read aloud with the examiner.  Following the 
story were physical and mental state questions.  Results revealed the study group (i.e. AS, 
PDD-NOS, and HFASD) performed equally well on TOM stories as their TD peers.  In 
other words, the Social Stories did not significantly distinguish the two groups from one 
another.  Additionally, performance on tasks was positively correlated with the child’s 
chronological age and verbal ability. 
  A similar assessment measure, referred to as the 6-Step TOM Scale (Peterson et 
al., 2012), aimed to measure diverse desires and beliefs, knowledge and access, false 
belief ability, hidden emotion, and sarcastic irony.  This measure was closely adapted 
from Wellman and Liu (2004).  A primary aim of researchers was to focus on the newly 
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created sarcastic irony task (SARC), which was considered important for “understanding 
of the social use of nonliteral language” (Peterson et al., 2012, pg. 474).  An example 
provided involved a story about a little boy and girl going on a picnic on a sunny day.  It 
begins to rain while they are one their picnic and their food is ruined.  The young girl 
then says to the boy, “It’s a lovely day for a picnic”.  This short story is read aloud to the 
child and she is presented with matching colored drawings.   Following the presentation, 
questions are asked to the child to see if they understood the sarcasm present in the story 
(i.e. “Is it true what the girl said, Why did the girl say it was a lovely day for a picnic? 
Was the girl happy about the rain?”). Participants included within this study were 
between the ages of five and twelve years of age and were formally diagnosed with AS or 
AD.  The remaining tasks also asked about the “focal contrast between a protagonist’s 
inner psychological state and either reality or the mental state of another protagonist” 
(Peterson et al., 2012, pg. 473).  Drawing and toys were used to facilitate comprehension 
of the presented stories. Results revealed that, across all 6 tasks, children with ASD were 
delayed in their performance compared to the TD group even after controlling for age and 
language ability.   
 
  
 26 
CHAPTER 3: Intervention Aimed at Improving Theory of Mind Ability 
A major goal of this review was to consider relevant research to support an 
understanding of the following question: Based on effective treatment and interventions, 
what can be concluded as the most appropriate interventions for children with autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD)? 
 This chapter will review research on the available published materials on 
interventions aimed at improving TOM in children with autism.  This analysis will allow 
some conclusions about effective intervention techniques for children with autism.   
Methods 
In order to address the preceding question, the following search procedures and inclusion 
criteria were set to ascertain studies of particular relevance to TOM interventions for 
children with ASD. 
Search Procedures.  
Systematic searches were conducted in five electronic databases: Communication & 
Mass Media Complete (CMMC), MEDLINE, Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied 
Health (CINAHL), and PsycINFO, and ERIC.  In all databases, the following terms were 
inserted into the keyword field: a) theory of mind intervention and children with autism 
Inclusion Criteria 
To be included in this review, the article had to meet the following criteria:  
(a) The studies included at least one participant with a formal diagnosis of autism, ASD, 
AS, HFASD, or PDD-NOS. 
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(b) The majority of participants in each intervention article had to be under the age of 
twelve.  Of the twelve intervention articles reviewed, two contained participants out of 
the specific age range.  For the purposes of this report, these results were interpreted with 
caution.  
(d) The studies contained interventions aimed at improving TOM ability for children 
under the age of twelve.  Five out of the twelve interventions also included training aimed 
at improving other areas of deficit in the child with HFASD (ex. social competence, 
social skills, executive functioning).  This dual focus allowed for conclusions to be made 
about generalization to TOM ability and also the effectiveness of contrasting techniques. 
 (e) Intervention articles were published in peer-reviewed journals after the year 1999 
(i.e. 2000-present).    
The most common reasons for exclusion were as follows: 1) The methods of assessment 
was based on interviewing parents or using checklists (2 of these), 3) The methods of 
assessment was solely qualitative in nature (1 of these) or 4) The studies focused on a 
comparison between two assessment measures rather than the differences in abilities 
between typically developing and children with ASD (2 of these).  
Results 
Table 3.1 includes key components of the literature that met study criteria for 
inclusion. It summarizes the following: 1) pertinent information including the number 
and age of participants, diagnosis, and measures of IQ, 2) type and length of training or 
intervention (i.e. T & L), 3) setting in which therapy was carried out (i.e. S), 4) specific 
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skills targeted in the intervention, 5) teaching strategies used during therapy sessions, and 
6) the outcomes of the interventions.   
Three broad categories of interventions were reviewed.  The first included 
interventions aimed solely at improving TOM skills.  Therapy sessions included specific 
TOM tasks such as first and second-order mental state reasoning, recognition of emotion, 
perception, and reality vs fantasy.  Researchers measured improvements in this area.   
The second broad category included TOM and Social Skills training (i.e. 
TOM+SS).  For these interventions, TOM was a portion of the focus of therapy.  An 
example of a therapy session within this category might include recognizing facial 
expressions, taking an adequate number of turns in conversation, and using appropriate 
social behavior with peers.    
The final category (i.e. SS) included studies aimed at improving other areas of 
social functioning (ex. executive functioning).  Researchers conducting studies were 
interested in whether improving another area of social deficit would generalize to 
improvements in TOM.  A summary of these interventions and subsequent outcomes are 
discussed below.     
Table 3.1 Summary of Interventions Aimed at Improving Theory of Mind 
 
Study Child T & L  S Target Skills  Strategies Results 
  TOM      
Begeer 
et al. 
(2011) 
N=40 
Age=
8-13  
AD, 
AS, 
PDD 
IQ>70 
TOM 
NS=53  
G  Listening, 
perception, 
fantasy vs reality, 
social situations, 
recognition of 
other’s intentions 
and emotions 
Second-order 
mental state 
reasoning; Direct 
TX and parent 
training; stimulated 
imagination and 
humor; hierarchical 
Improved conceptual 
TOM skills, but did not 
improve their elementary 
understanding, 
empathetic skills, and 
social behavior  
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
Wellman 
et al. 
(2002) 
N=10 
Age=
5-17 
AD 
 
TOM 
NS=30  
I  Introducing 
thought-bubbles, 
tasks focused on 
what happens to 
objects when you 
cannot see them 
Thought bubble 
training; 6 stages 
presented 
hierarchically; 
demonstration and 
feedback stages 
Improved ability to pass 
false belief tasks, efficacy 
of picture-in-the-head 
teaching about mental 
states through the use of 
thought bubbles; 
enhanced performance on 
transfer tasks  
Charlop-
Christy 
& 
Danechv
ar (2003) 
N=3 
Ages=
6-9 
AD 
 
TOM 
NS=Var
ied 
I First-order 
perspective 
taking; problem 
solving strategies 
5 perspective 
taking tasks were 
taught with video 
modeling and 
immediate review; 
adult model 
provided 
Children improved their 
TOM ability and 
demonstrated stimulus 
and response 
generalization 
Gould et 
al. 
(2011) 
N=3 
Ages=
3-5 
ASD 
TOM 
11-18 
mths 
(20 hrs 
per 
week) 
I  Basic perspective 
taking skills (i.e. 
identifying what 
another person 
can see during 
table-top tasks 
with two-
dimensional 
stimuli) 
Multiple exemplar 
training; Stimulus 
cards and therapist 
instruction using 
prompt-fading; 
generalization 
probes 
All children demonstrated 
consistent generalization 
to novel tasks, but not to 
natural environments  
Paynter 
& 
Peterson 
(2013) 
N=24 
Age=
4.6-
12.25 
ASD 
 
TOM 
NS=vari
ed 
I 5 training stages 
addressing TOM 
concepts (Stages 
1-5 same as 
Wellman et al. 
(2002), Stage 6: 
people have 
different thought 
bubbles 
depending on 
what they see)  
Thought bubble 
training; 
demonstration & 
feedback stages 
closely followed 
Wellman et al. 
(2002) 
Significant improvements 
were made by trained 
children; demonstrated 
generalization to novel 
TOM tasks  
Fisher & 
Happe 
(2005) 
N=27 
Age=
6.5-
15.3 
ASD, 
AS 
TOM & 
EF 
NS=4-
10  
I One group was 
trained on 
Theory of Mind 
and another 
group was 
trained on 
Executive 
Functioning (EF) 
Visual models (i.e. 
dolls, illustrative 
stories, photo and 
reminder cards); 
TOM Training: 
beliefs are “photos 
in the head”  
EF Training: our 
“brain as a 
machine” analogy 
TOM improved for both 
groups (i.e. TOM and 
EF); Generalization was 
demonstrated on TOM 
tasks; No improvement 
on EF for either group 
 30 
 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
  TOM+
SS 
    
Stichter 
et al. 
(2012) 
N=20 
Age=6.
75-
10.83A
D, 
ASD, 
AS, 
PDD 
IQ>70 
SCIE 
NS=20 
G  5 activity based 
units: recognizing 
facial expressions, 
sharing ideas, turn 
taking, 
recognizing 
feelings and 
emotions of self 
& others, problem 
solving  
Review of skills 
introduction of 
new skill, skill 
modeling, practice 
in structured and 
naturalistic 
activities, and 
review; free play 
& adult 
facilitation; 
teacher led 
positive behavior 
system 
Children demonstrated 
significant improvements 
on problem solving skills, 
and parent perceptions of 
social abilities, and 
executive functioning; No 
improvement on direct 
TOM assessment 
measures  
Beaumo
nt & 
Sofrono
ff 
(2008) 
N=49 
AS 
Ages=7
.5-11 
IQ>85 
 
JDTP 
NS=8 
G Aimed at 
enhancing 
complex emotion 
recognition, 
emotion 
regulation, and 
social interaction 
Junior Detective 
Computer Game; 
Small group social 
skills training 
included visual 
and verbal 
modeling, role-
play, and group 
discussion; parent 
training and 
teacher handouts  
Improved overall social 
skills and social 
functioning (per parent 
report); No improvement 
on emotion recognition 
assessment measures but 
some improvement made 
on emotion recognition 
tasks; no generalization 
Feng et 
al. 
(2008) 
N=1 
Age=11 
AD 
IQ=85 
TOM 
NS=61  
G
&
I  
Entry level TOM, 
emotional 
expression, 
advanced level 
TOM, and 
conversational 
interactions; 
identification of 
emotion, basic 
beliefs, first and 
second-order false 
beliefs 
TOM + Social 
Skill units; 
hierarchical; 
animated 
presentation, 
performance 
feedback, verbal 
prompting, role-
play, student 
sharing, scripts, 
and generalization 
tasks  
Participants appropriate 
social interactions 
increased substantially 
across settings; improved 
TOM test scores; parent, 
teachers, and peers 
responded positively to 
intervention 
  SS      
Chin & 
Bernard
-Opitz  
(2000) 
N=3 
Ages=5
.11-7.9 
HFASD 
 
CST 
NS=10 
I Making a 
conversation, 
turn-taking in 
conversation, 
listening, 
maintaining a 
topic, and 
changing topic  
Puppet story time,  
role-play, practice 
skills with trainer 
Children increased the 
amount of shared interest 
during conversation and 
appropriate responses; 
False belief performance 
did not improve   
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
Individual (I); Group (G); Number of participants (N); Number of Sessions (NS); Age (A); Intelligence 
quotient (IO); Autism disorder (AD); Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD); High functioning autism disorder 
(HFASD); Pervasive developmental disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD); Asperger syndrome (AS); 
Executive Functioning (EF) 
 
Theory of Mind Interventions 
 During examination of intervention approaches for children with ASD, several 
distinct categories were noted.  Of the total thirteen studies, six explicitly aimed to 
improve TOM ability.  Tasks involved in these interventions were directly related to 
understanding others intentions, emotions, and beliefs.  Five of the six studies yielded 
positive outcomes and generalization to novel tasks.  The remaining three studies 
reported variable performance outcomes.  
 The second group of interventions incorporated TOM tasks into a larger social 
skills training program.  This category consisted of three different interventions focused 
Baumin
ger-
Zviely 
et al. 
(2013) 
N=22 
ASD 
Age=9.
3 
IQ>70 
 
CTI & 
CBT  
NS=6  
G Social Skill 
Collaboration & 
Social 
Conversation; 
Computer 
programs included 
in intervention: 
“Join-in” and 
“No-Problem” 
Computerized 
social vignettes: 
joint performance, 
negotiating, and 
mutual planning; 
Social 
conversation: 
initiating, 
maintaining and 
ending 
conversation  
Improved total score of 
social engagement; 
Improved socio-cognitive 
measures; TOM partially 
improved (i.e. children 
could decide between truth 
and lies but could not 
justify why)  
William
s et al. 
(2012) 
N=55  
Ages=4
-7 
AD 
IQ>47 
ETP 
4 wks 
G Transporters 
DVD designed to 
teach emotion 
recognition skills 
was shown to 
children 
Video training Improved ability to 
recognize anger, but no 
generalization to TOM or 
social skills; poor 
maintenance  
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on improving social competence and conversational skills.  Regardless of the total 
number of skills taught, a portion of all the tasks explicitly aimed to improve TOM.  One 
out of the three studies revealed significant improvement in TOM capacity.  While the 
remaining two studies showed improved social skills, TOM capacity remained constant. 
  The final category of interventions included social skills training without TOM 
tasks.  Researchers were interested in whether trained social skills would generalize to 
improved TOM abilities.  As such, they measured TOM as a collateral outcome.  Out of 
all categories (i.e. TOM Training, Social Skills and TOM training, and Social Skill 
training), social skill training demonstrated the least amount of improvement in TOM 
capacity.  All three studies reviewed within this category showed little or no 
improvement, indicating generalization of TOM skills is not likely.    
 Below is a summary of the key elements of each intervention, outcomes/results, 
and the degree of generalization to novel tasks or environments. 
 
Theory of Mind Training 
Six out of the thirteen studies measured TOM based on explicit training (Begeer, 
et al., 2011; Wellman et al., 2004; Charlop-Christy & Danechvar, 2003; Gould, Tarbox, 
Hora, Noone, & Bergstrom, 2011; Paynter & Peterson, 2013; Fisher & Happe, 2005).   
Across all of the interventions, participants were between the ages of three and seventeen.   
Of all studies reviewed within this category, Gould et al. (2011) provided 
participants between 3 and 5 year of age the most time intensive training working on 
basic perspective taking skills.  Two dimensional photo stimulus cards were used to teach 
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the participants what people see.  Results were mixed: Children were able to generalize 
their learned skills to other similar tabletop tasks, but not to real life environments.  
Children were able to improve in the areas that were explicitly taught to them.   
Another long term intervention approach, conducted by Beeger et al. (2011), 
aimed to train participant’s conceptual understanding of TOM and emotion, self reported 
empathy, and parent reported social skills.  While participants, aged between 8 and 13 
years of age, improved on their ability to understand beliefs and false beliefs, parents 
reported this improvement was confined to conceptual abilities rather than real-life skills.  
Further, empathetic understanding and social skills remained unchanged.  Similar to 
Gould et al. (2011), children demonstrated the ability to improve in the areas that were 
explicitly taught to them.   
Wellman et al. (2002) and Paynter et al. (2013) demonstrated more promising 
results by using “thought bubble” training to a group of children between five and 
seventeen years of age.  Sessions focused on teaching participants that thoughts are like 
pictures-in-the-head.  Using cardboard cutouts (i.e. Sally-Anne figures) and attached 
thought bubbles, trainers were able to progress through a hierarchy of increasingly 
complex stages related to thoughts of others.  For Wellman et al. (2002) and Paynter et al. 
(2013) improvement was observed during post testing, generalization was seen during 
novel TOM tasks, and measurable improvement was noted in the understanding of 
thoughts rather than just understanding of behavior.  Similar results were found for Fisher 
& Happe (2005) through the use of visual models (ex. dolls, photo cards).  Trainers 
taught participants between the ages of 6 and 15 years of age that beliefs are like “photos 
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in the head” during individual, short-term therapy sessions.  Improvement was measured 
on TOM tasks and also to untrained novel stimulus.      
Charlop-Christy & Danechvar (2003) incorporated video modeling into training 
five, first-order perspective taking tasks.  Three children took part in the intervention who 
were between six and nine years old.  After each video was shown twice, trainers 
immediately reviewed and provided participants with an adult model.  Although all 
participants showed stimulus and response generalization, only two of the three 
participants experienced generalization to untrained tasks, novel tasks. 
Although results were mixed, all studies suggested that participants improve in 
TOM ability.  The degree to which this change was seen varied from study to study, with 
the most positive outcomes being when participants were presented with visual models 
and aids (Wellman et al., 2002; Paynter & Peterson., 2013; Fisher & Happe, 2005).  
Furthermore, these interventions presented tasks in a hierarchical manner, incorporated 
the use of demonstration, provided participants with verbal feedback, and conducted at 
least a portion of the training individually with participants.   
 
Theory of Mind & Social Skills Training 
The second broad category interventions incorporated TOM and social skill 
training together (Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Feng, Lo, Tsai, & Cartledge, 2008; 
Stichter, O’Conner, Herzog, Lierheimer, & McGhee, 2012).  Participants across all 
interventions in this category were between six and eleven years of age.  All of the 
training programs took place with small groups and lasted between a total of eight and 
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thirty-two sessions.  For Feng et al. (2008) and Stichter et al. (2012), TOM and social 
skill units were presented in a hierarchical manner and included tasks such as emotional 
expression and recognition, turn taking/sharing, and recognizing the feelings and 
emotions of yourself and others.  Common teaching strategies included role-play practice 
and skill modeling.  Stichter et al. (2012) incorporated the concept, “Rules of the Road” 
into the Social Competence Intervention, which was presented to the participants before 
sessions.  This was a critical piece to intervention and involved instructing participants 
between the ages of six and 11 years of age on greetings in social interactions, making 
appropriate eye contact, and acknowledging initiations of others.  Stichter et al. (2012) 
reported significant improvement on problem solving abilities, social skills, and 
executive functioning.  In regards to TOM measures, first-order tasks remained stable 
from pre to post intervention and participants actually experienced a regression on 
second-order false beliefs.  In contrast to this performance, participants demonstrated 
improvement in their ability to recognize social mistakes during Faux pas tasks.   
Feng et al. (2008) provided individual and group therapy to one eleven-year-old 
participant, which allowed for personalized target skills to be addressed.  Unique from 
other interventions in this category, tasks were presented using animation, teaching 
scripts guided sessions, and generalization tasks were carried out to increase the 
likelihood of carryover.  This involved naturalistic practice of skills in the classroom 
setting.  Drastic improvements were observed on all of the eight learner outcomes (i.e. 
desire-based belief, basic beliefs, emotion expression, anger control, first and second-
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order false belief, greeting, and needs expression).  These results were maintained during 
follow-up conditions and generalization was noted.  
The Junior Detective Training Program (JDTP) aimed at enhancing complex 
emotion recognition (i.e. guilt, embarrassment, suspicion, and teasing), emotion 
regulation, and social interaction for children between the ages of 7 and eleven. 
(Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008).  Therapy was carried out in small groups and was mainly 
centered on the Junior Detective Computer Game, which taught all social skills.  To 
ensure carryover of these skills, small group sessions reiterated computer game content 
and allowed the children to practice emotion recognition and social skills.  Results 
indicated improved social functioning that was maintained five months post-intervention.  
Emotion recognition measures, on the other hand, did not show improvement as a result 
of the intervention.   
 
Effects of Socials Skills Training on TOM 
 The final category of interventions included training aimed solely on social skills 
training (Chin & Bernard-Opitz , 2000; Bauminger-Zviely, Eden, Zancanaro, Weiss, & 
Gal, 2013; Williams, Gray, & Tonge, 2012).  Participants within this category of 
interventions fell between the ages of five and nine. 
 Without directly targeting tasks specific to TOM, researchers wanted to see if 
effects of social skills training would have any impact on a child’s ability to take on the 
perspective of others.  Chin & Bernard-Opitz (2000) conducted Conversational Skills 
Training (CST), which included making a conversation, turn-taking in conversation, and 
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listening, maintaining, and changing a topic.  All ten sessions were conducted in the 
participant’s home, and visual models (i.e. puppets) and role-play were the major 
components used when teaching specific tasks.  Results showed that while children did 
improve on their ability to carry on a successful conversation, their performance on false 
belief tasks did not change.  Thus, generalization to TOM improvement was not seen.   
 Bauminger-Zviely et al. (2013) conducted a Collaborative Technology 
Intervention (CTI) incorporating the use of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT).  
Similar to Chin & Bernard-Opitz (2000), researchers were interested in the indirect 
effects this training would have on TOM skills.  Computer programming was a major 
component of the intervention, which provided participants with social vignettes focused 
on joint attention, peer negotiations, mutual planning, and initiating and maintaining a 
conversation.  While there was notable improvement in the overall social engagement 
and socio-cognitive measures (i.e. increased explanations of collaborative acts, social 
conversation, and social solutions) as a result of the intervention, minimal improvement 
was seen in regards to TOM.  As a result of treatment, participants were able to 
distinguish the difference between truth and lies, but when asked to provide related 
justifications and explanations they were unable to give adequate responses.  It was 
concluded that generalization to TOM ability was little to none.   
In very similar nature to Collaborative Technology Intervention, Williams et al. 
(2012) incorporated the use of technology into therapy.  For four weeks, children 
participated in an Emotion Training Program (ETP), wherein they watched videos 
intended to teach basic emotion recognition skills.   While children did improve on their 
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ability to identify and match expressions of a few basic emotions (i.e. anger) post-
treatment, it was not maintained during follow-up testing.  Furthermore, there was no 
generalization to improvements in TOM skills.  As a result, the Emotion Training 
Program provided limited benefits not only for TOM skills, but also for general 
improvement in emotion recognition. 
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CHAPTER 4: Discussion 
In order to better understand social perceptions of children with ASD, a meta-
analysis of research studies that met inclusion criteria for TOM was conducted.  Thirteen 
articles examined assessment of TOM abilities of varying degrees of complexity.  
Overall, results indicate that children with ASD perform less well than their typically 
developing peers.  Although variable, across the majority of tasks, both first and second-
order false belief tasks were able to discriminate between ASD and typically developing 
child populations.     
In addition to a review of assessment literature, an evaluation of published 
reviews of available TOM interventions was also conducted.  In total, twelve studies 
were examined in order to pick out recurring and effective key components across 
different articles.  Results indicate that improvements in TOM capacities are possible.  
The most efficient way to target TOM seems to be in an explicit manner that is both 
motivating and salient to the child.  Interestingly, results showed no generalization of 
TOM skills when social skills are taught alone.  Implications of these findings are further 
discussed below.    
 
Social Perception of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
A major goal of this review was to answer the following question: Based on the 
available assessment research examining theory of mind deficits, how do children with 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) socially perceive their peers?   
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In order to answer this question, a closer examination into what TOM assessments 
measured and how children with ASD compared to typically developing peers was 
analyzed.  A common theme noted across TOM assessment tasks included measurement 
of a child’s ability to understand another’s thoughts, feelings, or emotions.  Although 
there were varying degrees of complexity, this held true for first and second-order false 
belief tasks. 
Examining TOM assessments from birth to age twelve revealed that, on the 
whole, children with ASD performed less well on tasks as compared to their typically 
developing peers.  Although children with ASD were delayed in areas relevant to TOM 
(eg. false-belief, emotion recognition, etc.), a complete lack of TOM abilities was rarely 
observed in participants.  Furthermore, the ability to pass TOM tasks was correlated with 
age; as children developed, so did their ability to pass increasingly complex tasks.  This 
brings about a critical element relevant to TOM development; abilities seem to be 
delayed rather than lacking all together.  While a slower trajectory of growth undoubtedly 
presents social challenges for children with ASD in school and home environments, it 
should be promising for parents and families to know that change takes place naturally.  
This is not to suggest that area of deficit should remain untreated; rather, assessment and 
intervention should be tailored to the individual and begin where he/she is 
developmentally.  The major goal for professionals assessing and treating this population 
should be to try and close the gap currently existing for children with ASD.  
An examination of the available TOM assessments revealed that false belief tasks 
measure how a child perceives another person.  From a broad perspective, these social 
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judgments were more egocentric in nature for the child with ASD (Beeger et al., 2013), 
and contained more context inappropriate responses (Kaland et al., 2008) when compared 
to the typically developing participants.  It is possible that measurable deficits of this 
nature result from children basing their social judgments on personal experience rather 
than typical social norms (Loveland et al., 2001).  As such, children with ASD may 
unintentionally violate social norms while in one-on-one conversation with a peer.  This 
undoubtedly impacts a child in a social sphere, especially in an education environment 
where social interactions and learning are closely intertwined.        
Several researchers also gave special consideration to attention and autism.  As 
demonstrated by Kaland et al. (2008), children with ASD needed more prompting in 
order to answer questions on the Strange Stories task and on the Stories from Everyday 
Life task.  Additionally, Beaumont & Sotronoff (2008) showed that children with ASD 
answered poorly on memory questions compared to TD peers.  Participants in this study 
also had trouble with real life gaze information.  These results suggest that attention may 
impact a child’s ability to attend to specific tasks.  This undoubtedly carries over to real-
life situation, particularly during conversational and one-on-one interactions. The ability 
to attend to and maintain conversation may be especially challenging when added 
distractions (i.e. television, iPad, other conversations, etc.) are present.  
To better understand how social perception and theory of mind go hand in hand, 
consider the following example:  
During free-play time in an inclusion-based classroom with twenty typically 
developing kindergarteners, Aden is searching for his favorite toy.  Aden is a child 
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diagnosed with ASD, and presents with moderate to severe behaviors, especially when 
having to negotiate the sharing of toys with peers.  Naturally, this is the most challenging 
time of the day for him. Aden sees his classmate Ben with his favorite toy race car.  
Instead of verbally asking to have a turn, Aden becomes visibly upset and throws himself 
on the floor in front of Ben.  His teacher knows it’s not because he is lacking the 
expressive language abilities to ask for a turn with the toy car, so she doesn't understand 
why he has such difficulty with this task.  When considering many of the first-order 
assessment tasks (ex. Sally-Anne, sandbox task, seeing is knowing task, etc.), some 
conclusion can be made as to what might be going on with Aden.  If Aden is in fact 
lacking the very basic TOM understanding, then this means he genuinely believes that his 
peer holds the same privileged knowledge that he does, which is: "I should have that race 
car right now."  We know some children with ASD respond on TOM tasks in a more 
egocentric or biased way, meaning they believe others hold the same knowledge, 
thoughts, or desires as their own.  In this case, it would make sense that Aden doesn't 
understand he needs to verbally explain his desire to have the toy because he thinks Ben 
already knows.  Taking this example a step further, we also know that children with ASD 
perform less well than typically developing peers when predicting emotions from the eye 
region.  Even if Aden looked at the child holding the toy, who is likely showing some 
signs of distress, there is a good chance he would not be able to discern how he was 
making his classmate feel by acting out.  While this example is simple and surely doesn’t 
adequately describe all children with ASD, it demonstrates how deficits in theory of mind 
can negatively impact children in a social setting. 
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Limitations of TOM Assessments 
Although the majority of assessment measures have been shown to successfully 
distinguish between children with ASD and their typically developing peers, it is 
important to consider some apparent weaknesses that might have an impact on 
performance outcomes.  
The most obvious weakness deals with presentation of assessment tasks.  When 
asking a child to look at a two-dimensional piece of stimulus and decipher the hidden 
meaning behind it (i.e. thoughts, beliefs, or intentions of the characters on the page), 
several problems can arise.  First, children with ASD may not have the required 
motivation to attend to tasks of this nature.  When tasks are lengthy in addition to being 
complex in nature, a child may not provide his/her best answers.  A second issue with 
two-dimensional stimuli is how performance translates to real-life scenarios.  For 
example, although Beeger et al. (2012) aimed to create a task that would detect a more 
subtle egocentric bias, the apparent weakness is the lack of real-life applicability.  
Children were tested on their belief of the location of an object buried within a sandbox.  
However, the sandbox was a color drawing and the ‘object’ was indicated by an ‘X’.  For 
children with ASD who already have challenges picking up on subtleties this may not 
translate effectively, and in turn, may not accurately test a child’s true abilities.    
Another limitation with TOM assessments is that there are currently very few tasks 
for children under the age of four.  As revealed by the literature review, no participants 
were under four years.  This presents a problem for early identification of ASD.  Because 
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TOM is thought to be a unique feature to those with ASD, it would be extremely 
beneficial to have effective assessment measures available for the younger population. 
Ceiling effects during testing is another limitation to consider.  During the Smarties 
task (Van Buijsen et al. 2011) and SERT (Peterson & Slaughter, 2009) ceilings were 
either reached or nearly reached for all of the participants, which made it difficult to 
distinguish performance across populations. Furthermore, it lessened the degree to which 
real life events could be represented in a task.  This reveals a need for assessment tasks 
that have a broad enough spectrum to appropriately detect deficits across a broad 
population.   This is mainly due to the fact that TOM deficits vary greatly between 
individuals so ceilings should be high enough to encompass expansive set of strengths 
and weaknesses.      
Many assessments are heavily language based; considering the first-order false belief 
tasks, each required participants answer ‘wh’ questions.  Answering questions such as 
this requires both receptive and expressive language abilities.  Thus, performance 
outcomes are undoubtedly impacted by language abilities.  While there is not a clear 
solution to this issue, it does warrant a discussion.  An important question should be 
considered: should researchers attempt to remove language from TOM assessments?  The 
role of language in TOM development is particularly relevant to this discussion.  Mental 
states, such as “I think” or “I know”, are unobservable (Miller, 2006).  This presents a 
unique challenge for children in the early stages of acquisition; this domain of learning 
may be more ambiguous than acquiring vocabulary that can be accompanied by actual 
objects or actions (i.e. ball, horse, jump, sit, etc.).  Because language is a major 
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component of TOM acquisition and development, it seems that language embedded in 
assessment tasks would be appropriate.  On the other hand, if a child’s language abilities 
fall short in either expressive or receptive domains, this has the potential to 
unintentionally impact TOM performance.   
Interestingly, several of the intervention articles reviewed discussed potential 
weaknesses of TOM assessment measures (Chin & Bernard-Opitz, 2000, Stichter et al., 
2012).  Researchers suggested that the assessment measures utilized for measuring pre 
and post-abilities may not adequately measure the change seen as a result of the 
intervention.  Stichter et al. (2012) suggested TOM assessments are more “static” in 
nature and do not measure complex skills.  Similarly, Chin & Bernard-Opitz (2000) used 
assessments to measure pre and post abilities but no improvements were observed.  
Researchers suggested this was not a result of poor intervention; rather, it was the fact 
that TOM is a complex construct.  As a result, real life theory of mind application may 
require different facets of the construct that are not measured by TOM tasks.  Scheeren et 
al. (2013) similarly suggested that subtle real-life TOM deficits are not being detected 
through TOM assessment batteries.   
While assessments have been shown to detect differences in performance between 
children with ASD as compared to TD peers, the question remains: do TOM assessment 
measures detect change in these domains reliably?  Based on the literature reviewed, 
growth is still needed for reliable measures that consistently measure TOM capacity.   
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Interventions Aimed at Improving Theory of Mind 
A major goal of this review is to answer the following question: Based on 
effective treatment and interventions, what can be concluded as the most appropriate 
interventions for children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD)? 
Taking on another person’s perspective is difficult for even a typically developing 
child.  Learning how to share, for example, requires a child to understand that giving up a 
toy has the potential to make another child happy.  This taps into the most basic first-
order TOM understanding.  For a child with ASD, mastering skills of this nature are often 
the most challenging.   
Based on the available literature, TOM training has shown to be effective when 
TOM was either explicitly taught or when it was incorporated into a larger social skills 
curriculum.  On the contrary, no collateral effects on TOM were demonstrated when 
other areas were trained such as emotion training or conversation skills (Bauminger-
Zviely et al., 2013; Chin & Bernard-Opitz, 2000; Williams et al. 2012).  The one 
exception to this was noted during executive functioning training; generalization to TOM 
improvement was noted (Fisher & Happe, 2005).  More than likely, this was due to 
executive functioning and theory of mind tasks being very similar in nature.  From these 
results, it was concluded that generalization of TOM skills is not likely, and therefore, 
should be explicitly taught to children with ASD.   
As previously discussed, there is a broad variation of TOM abilities that exist, 
even amongst children in the same population.   As a result, the most beneficial and 
effective interventions seem to be those that are tailored to the individual.   Feng et al. 
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(2008) demonstrated the most effective use of this method, likely because researchers had 
only one participant receiving treatment.  This allowed for goals to be uniquely tailored 
to the child, particular to his specific needs.  Considering the complex nature of TOM, 
creating unique goals for each child is key for an individual who presents with deficits in 
this area.  Therapists working with this population should start where each child is 
developmentally and work up from there in a hierarchical manner.  This seems to be the 
most effective way to close the currently existing gap in TOM deficits.  For example, if a 
child with ASD demonstrates little to no TOM capacity, then basic precursors such as 
joint attention, use of gestures and mental state terms (i.e. think, know, want), pretend 
play, appreciation of intentionality, and recognition of differing perspectives (Miller, 
2006) should be the focus of therapy.  Working up from there would be the most natural 
progression, tackling basic first-order false belief tasks targeting goals relative to 
manipulating tangible objects and/or actions.  Goal should continually increase in a 
hierarchal manner as the child demonstrates an increasingly complex awareness of others 
thought, feelings, and beliefs.  Much like other speech and language therapy, it is 
important that a child master the most basic forms of TOM before more complex forms 
are taught.     
Considering tailored interventions are often the most time intensive and costly, it 
is important that the specific tasks targeted are also the most effective.  After reviewing 
the literature, two explicit teaching strategies aimed at improving TOM skills resulted in 
the most positive outcomes.  These included 1) the use of visual aids, and 2) practice 
within a naturalistic environment.  Visual aids included items such as thought-bubbles, 
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stimulus cards, videos, and computer animations.  Thought-bubble training revealed 
generalization to post-performance and children were able to make improvements 
answering questions about other thoughts (Wellman et al., 2002).  Training of this nature 
seems to be not only an effective and motivating intervention strategy for children with 
ASD, but the visual support may provide a method of compensation for children lacking 
in TOM.  Computer animation was also utilized in many of the intervention approaches, 
and while it did prove to be motivating, it was only shown to be effective when 
incorporated with real-life naturalistic practice.  Thus, computer programming and 
animation should be utilized appropriately and as a tool to teach skills.  It should never be 
the main component to an intervention; rather, it should be incorporated with other 
teaching strategies such as role-play.  Similar conclusions can be drawn with the use of 
stimulus cards (Gould et al. 2011).       
It is also important to consider the level practicality in terms of administration of 
visual aids in treatment.  Although variability exists, it seems to be fairly easy and 
straightforward therapy technique to administer.  This particular teaching strategy would 
be helpful for therapists with large caseloads with little time to plan sessions or for 
teachers providing therapy to children in the classroom.  
 The second effective teaching strategy focused on placing learned skills into a 
natural environment to aid in carryover of skills.  As one might imagine, it is important 
that TOM skills carryover, or generalize to real-life scenarios.  In fact, this is the single 
most important piece to any intervention for children with ASD.  Practice in a natural 
setting increase the likelihood that generalization will take place and treatment effects 
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will be maintained.  Within the articles reviewed, researchers utilized natural settings in 
order to carry out demonstrations, provide feedback (Feng et al., 2008; Paynter & 
Peterson, 2013;  Stichter et al., 2012; Wellman et al. 2002), carry out group discussions 
(Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008), practice role-play scenarios, provide teaching scripts, 
facilitate student sharing, and maintain generalization tasks (Feng et al., 2008).  
Additionally, practice within a natural setting simply allows a child exposure to social 
interactions.  Because TOM is so complex in nature, it is imperative that skills be 
explicitly taught within environments that translate and make sense for that child.  
 Another important consideration to address is language and the intrinsic tie it has 
to TOM.  As previously discussed in regards to TOM assessment, it is difficult to remove 
language from the equation; the same goes for TOM intervention.  For children with 
ASD, language and social pragmatics are often major areas of focus in treatment. Long 
and short-term goals, which drive therapy sessions, are centered on these areas.  
Mastering the use of pronouns, for example, is as task that requires both TOM and 
language skills.   As a result, SLPs are often charged with the responsibility to create 
developmentally appropriate goals that are applicable across both domains. 
 While there doesn’t seem to be one intervention that is better than the rest, it does 
seem that several broad conclusions can be made in regards to effective TOM treatment 
for children with ASD.  First, any intervention should incorporate tasks into real life 
scenarios that are both applicable and salient to the particular child receiving therapy.  In 
order for the child to carry skills into their daily lives, tasks should be relevant and 
applicable to that child.   
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From the perspective of a professional required to set specific goals and carry out 
therapy with this population, it is often a challenge to know where to begin.  The 
following is a simplified example of how TOM intervention might look for a child 
struggling in this area:  
A mother reports her six year old child named Fred is having a particularly 
challenging time when interacting with his younger sister after school. The mother thinks 
the major problem stems from Fred not being able to share toys with his sister. He was 
diagnosed with PDD-NOS three years prior and has been seeking treatment for him ever 
since.  The new therapist working with Fred, who has administered several different 
TOM assessments, knows that Fred is lacking in his basic understanding of first-order 
false belief.  The therapist creates a session focusing on role-play between Fred and his 
younger sister (the therapist takes the role of the sister).  As they practice playing in a 
natural setting, the therapist targets how she is feeling when she wants the object that 
Fred has.  She incorporates visual aids (i.e. thought bubbles, emotion cards) so that Fred 
has added support during sessions.  Fred can express himself and receive constructive 
feedback at the same time.  This task aims to teach Fred that people have thoughts 
different from his own and that his actions, in this case sharing, can affect those around 
him.  As sessions progress the therapist can move up the hierarchy to increasingly more 
complex TOM tasks.  
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Limitations of Intervention Techniques  
While many of the interventions have shown to be effective in improving TOM 
capacity, the apparent weaknesses should be discussed for future clinicians providing 
intervention to this growing population.  Theory of mind is extremely complex in nature.  
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact areas of deficit experienced by a particular child.  
Furthermore, TOM deficits manifest in vastly different ways across children, even those 
belonging to the same population.  This presents a challenge to professionals working in 
this area.  It is also possible that assessment measures are not providing a complete 
picture of a child’s true ability, which makes it particularly difficult to know what areas 
are most in need of intervention.  
   There was an apparent lack of real-life, naturalistic practice during training on 
techniques.  For example, Gould et al. (2011) utilized stimulus cards during tabletop tasks 
to guide training of basic TOM skills.  Two-dimensional training of this nature did not 
provide the child with a good representation of real-life perspective taking.  Because 
generalization was seen to novel tabletop tasks but not to real life real life environments, 
the participants were capable of learning what was explicitly taught to them.  Similarly, 
Beeger et al. (2011) carried out intervention that focused on conceptual rather than 
practical TOM skills.  Results showed there was no improvement in TOM skills in a 
natural environment, likely because of the lack of real-life practice during the 
intervention.  This outcome is further confirmed by the fact that conceptual TOM skills 
did improve, which demonstrates children are capable of improving in this domain.  
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However, results indicate value in two-dimensional, visual models (Wellman et 
al., 2002; Paynter et al., 2012; Fisher & Happe, 2005).  Each intervention approach that 
utilized these materials did so in addition to other tasks.  For example, Wellman et al. 
(2002) utilized thought-bubbles (i.e. two-dimensional training) in addition to 
demonstration and feedback stages.  Fisher & Happe (2005) incorporated dolls and 
illustrative stories into therapy.  From these results it is possible to conclude the 
following: Two-dimensional training should be used in addition to other salient tasks 
such as clinician facilitated one-on-one peer conversation.  Furthermore, training skills 
should be taught within a rich and meaningful context.   
The most apparent weakness was the overall lack of generalization of trained 
skills to natural, real-life environments.  Although carry-over was seen to novel tasks 
during several post-measurements, only one study (Feng et al., 2008) reported 
generalization to natural environments.  Several studies were interested in pre and post-
performance, but did not highlight generalization to natural settings.  Additionally, the 
success of certain intervention approaches was measured based on novel tasks 
specifically created for the intervention.  Although these measures are important, the lack 
of focus on generalization presents a major problem in the area of TOM intervention.  
These deficits can be attributed to one of two things: 1) children are unable to learn the 
adequate skills, or 2) there is a deficiency present in interventions techniques in terms of 
real-life applicability.  Based on the research reviewed we know children are capable of 
learning in areas specific to TOM.  As such, it seems that the interventions may be 
deficient in their attention to generalization.  Increased focus to this area is a critical 
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element to improving TOM abilities and ultimately closing the gap for children with 
ASD.       	  
Practical Applications 
 Practical applications should be considered relevant to assessment and 
intervention of  TOM skills for children with ASD.  Based on what is known in regards to 
the development of TOM, change appears to occur naturally as children grow.  For this 
reason, it is imperative that professionals working with this population frequently 
administer TOM assessment tasks to accurately document strengths and weaknesses of 
the clients they are working with. Ongoing assessment ensures that the evolving TOM 
capacity is well documented and better treated.    
In addition it is important that multiple TOM tasks are administered to one 
particular individual when determining strengths and weaknesses.  Each assessment 
reviewed in this report measured theory of mind using different elements, or key 
components.  Although different methods were used to achieve their goal, the Sally-Anne 
task, Smarties task, and the Charlie task aimed to measure the same basic TOM 
understanding (Van Buijsen et al., 2011).  Similarly, the ATOMIC and Social Stories 
tasks aimed to measure second-order false belief understanding using distinct items 
(Beaumont & Sotronoff, 2008; Scheeren et al., 2013).  ATOMIC targeted complex 
mental states through a series of questions pertaining to a character’s cognition.  
Although Social Stories also used story narratives, they targeted children’s understanding 
of sarcasm, faux pas, and double bluffs.  Therefore, results from one assessment 
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undoubtedly revealed unique results as compared to another assessment.  When assessing 
a new client, an SLP will want to administer a range of assessments.  Hopefully, some 
commonalities will be seen across assessments and provide a solid picture of the child’s 
abilities particular to TOM.    
 In regard to intervention, it appears that explicit training using visual models in a 
natural environment are the most effective teaching strategies.  There was a consensus 
across studies reviewed that improvement in TOM rarely takes place without explicit 
training It is for this reason that children with ASD who are experiencing deficits in this 
area should receive specialized training and support. Research has also suggested that 
specialized educational settings with smaller ratio classes may lead to more positive 
(Beckman & Kohl, 1987) and increased (King, 2004) social interactions for children with 
ASD.   
 
Future Research 
With the steady increase in the number of individuals diagnosed with ASD brings 
the need for the maximally efficient and accurate assessment measures.  TOM assessment 
task performance should be consistent with actual performance in real-life settings, which 
is a difficult task to accomplish.  TOM assessments should be geared toward measuring 
abilities within a natural environment to capture a child’s true abilities.  
It is surprising that generalization into natural environments was not a core feature 
of intervention studies.  Future research should investigate different techniques for theory 
of mind treatment that positively impacts and carries over to natural settings.  In 
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particular, there is a need for studies exploring the use of combined social skills and 
theory of mind treatment that focuses on the use of visuals, technology, modeling, role-
play, and naturalistic practice.  Further, a major focus of these interventions should be to 
effectively measure the carry-over of skills to new and varying environments.   
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